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Summary 
China’s rural health services are experiencing problems associated with the transition to a market 
economy. The cost of care has risen rapidly and arrangements for local health insurance have collapsed. 
Government health budgets have lagged behind the rise in costs. Major illness has become an important 
precursor of household poverty. Policy-makers acknowledge that something has to be done to improve 
access to effective services at an affordable cost. Government policy statements have articulated a vision 
of a future health system. Few disagree with this vision but people do disagree about how to attain it. 
Chinese health policy analysts have begun to ask fundamental questions about the role of government, 
forms of facility ownership and alternative health financing mechanisms. This paper argues that the health 
sector’s problems are best understood in the context of China’s attempt to create institutional 
arrangements appropriate to a market economy. It suggests that the performance of rural health services 
will be strongly influenced by the degree to which rules-based local administrative and regulatory systems 
and local accountability mechanisms become established. 
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1  Introduction 
China has been in transition to a market economy since the late 1970s. This attempt rapidly to establish a 
market economy and protect the population against excessive dislocation and suffering is a complex 
process for which there are few precedents (Nolan 1995; Rawski 1999). The Chinese approach to 
transition can be understood as a continuing negotiation. It has benefits and costs. The economy has 
grown rapidly and household incomes have risen substantially. There is a relatively stable environment, 
within which stakeholders have adapted to change. People have had time to revise their views of how to 
order social relationships as markets have emerged. China has avoided the kind of institutional collapse 
that other transitional economies have experienced (Reddaway and Glinski 2001). 
Some argue that that the gradual adaptation of institutions to a market economy has resulted in 
substantial economic losses (Woo 1999). They suggest that the government could have created a legal 
framework appropriate to a market economy at an early stage of the transition. The absence of a well-
defined regulatory framework, they argue, has encouraged certain kinds of opportunistic behaviour. 
Interest groups have been able to retard change and individuals and institutions have taken advantage of 
incentives provided by partially liberalised markets. Inequalities have risen between regions and social 
groups (Khan and Riskin 2001).  
This paper explores the management of transition in the health sector. It reviews the health sector’s 
development before and after the commencement of the transition to a market economy, situates it in the 
context of transition and explores recent debates about strategies for reconstructing a coherent rural 
health system. It pursues two main arguments. The first is that the health system has to be understood as a 
complex set of relationships between stakeholders with different interests and positional power. These 
stakeholders must share expectations about appropriate behavioural norms for it to perform well. This 
means that health reform has to be situated in the broader context of economic and institutional 
transition. The second is that transition implies profound changes at a discourse level in how institutional 
arrangements and relationships are constructed. Transition changes the rules for negotiating behavioural 
norms, establishing and internalising contracts (implicit and explicit), and understanding accountability.  
 
2  Fifty years of rural health development 
 
2.1 The three-tier rural health system 
In the 30 years after 1949 China greatly reduced its population’s burden of sickness and premature death. 
This was largely due a lessening of severe poverty, improvements to the rural environment and increases 
in literacy. The health sector contributed by providing preventive programmes and effective and 
affordable basic medical care (World Bank 1997).  
By the mid-1970s China had established a rural health system with the institutional arrangements that 
analysts believe necessary for it to perform well. These include a network of appropriate facilities and 
personnel, social financing of a large proportion of health expenditure and mechanisms to coordinate 
1 
service providers and encourage health workers to act in the community’s interest (Chernichovsky 1995). 
The specific arrangements reflected the prevailing economic and institutional realities (Tang et al. 1994).  
Most villages had a health station with several part-time health workers. They organised public health 
campaigns and provided basic health services. Each commune (now called townships) had a health centre, 
with several doctors and assistant doctors. These facilities coordinated and supervised public health 
programmes and provided medical care. The county health bureau was responsible for the performance of 
local health services. It prepared plans and allocated the annual government budget. County institutions 
supervised township and village facilities and provided referral services.  
Village personnel were paid a share of collective production. Health centre workers were paid either a 
share of collective production, or a government salary. County-level workers remained government 
employees. Village and township health facilities charged patients a small fee and sold drugs and other 
consumable items. People paid more at the county hospital. Most communes established local health 
insurance schemes, which derived revenue from household contributions and collective welfare funds. 
They provided some services free of charge and reimbursed a proportion of other medical costs. 
 
2.2 Adjustment to the emerging market economy 
During the 1980s and 1990s the rural health system had to adapt to the transition to a market economy. It 
also had to adjust to demographic and epidemiological changes, urbanisation and industrialisation 
(Hussein 1999). The institutional arrangements for the rural health system changed a great deal during that 
period (Bloom and Gu 1997). The dotted lines in Figure 2.1 indicate functional relationships that became 
weaker. The following paragraphs describe these changes. 
 
Figure 2.1 Changes in functional relationships in China’s rural health system since the 
late 1970s 
users of health  providers of health 
services services
social sources of co-ordination 
and 
management 
regulation 
finance 
 
 
Public sector pay increased, reflecting income rises in rapidly growing regions. The government devolved 
financial management to lower levels (Wong et al. 1995). Governments of poor rural areas experienced 
growing financial problems. By 1998 township health centres received only 10.5 per cent of their 
expenditure from government and village clinics received almost no government support (Fu et al. 2000). 
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County hospitals also depend largely on user charges, although a significant number of their patients are 
beneficiaries of the health insurance scheme for government employees. 
Health facilities now compete for patients. Supervision and referral has diminished. Government 
officials no longer influence day-to-day management of health facilities. Also, they are much more 
concerned with economic growth than the performance of health services. Many local governments do 
not have the resources to monitor and regulate the health sector effectively. Health facilities have a great 
deal of autonomy. There are an increasing number of private providers. 
The rural health services increasingly resemble a poorly regulated market. The government has only 
begun to establish a regulatory framework to replace previous systems for influencing health providers. It 
retains powers from the past. For example, it controls prices. It has kept charges for consultations and 
hospital days low, but allowed facilities to earn a surplus from drug sales and test fees. This has 
encouraged high levels of drug use (Zhan et al. 1997; Dong et al. 1999).  
Health facilities in rich areas provide an increasingly sophisticated mix of services, but at rising cost. 
Facilities in poor localities provide a smaller range of services than before, partly because they have lost 
their best personnel (Tang 1999; Gong et al. 1997). Preventive programmes have deteriorated in some 
localities (Shu and Yao 1997). The cost of rural health services has risen quickly. For example, the cost of 
an outpatient visit and an inpatient day increased two to three-fold in county hospitals and township 
health centres between 1993 and 1998 compared to a 60 per cent increase in the overall consumer price 
index and a 41 per cent increase in the rural consumer price index (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Percentage increase in cost of service in county hospitals and township health 
centres, 1993–8 
 County hospitals Township health centres 
Business Revenue 170% 121% 
Total outpatient visits -14% -15% 
Total inpatient admissions -6% -7% 
Cost per outpatient visit 232% 141% 
Cost per inpatient day 208% 157% 
Consumer price index 60% 
Rural consumer price index 41% 
 
Source: World Bank (2002: Table 7.14) 
 
Most local health insurance schemes collapsed so that 87 per cent of villagers had no health insurance in 
1998 (Meng and Hu 2000). There is evidence that decisions to consult a doctor, purchase a course of drug 
therapy or accept admission to hospital are influenced by cost. Some borrow money to pay for treatment. 
A MoH study claims that a family’s poverty can be attributed to disease or injury in 23 per cent of cases 
(Meng and Hu 2000).  
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3  Health development in the context of transition 
The rural health system presents a paradox. There is a dense network of health facilities and many health 
workers (although the best qualified have moved to urban facilities). There are reasonably high levels of 
health expenditure and no drug shortages. Despite this, many rural residents find it difficult to gain access 
to services and there is growing concern about the impact of major illness on household poverty. This 
section situates this poor performance in the context of the changing institutional environment and the 
need to negotiate new arrangements and behavioural norms. 
 
3.1 The institutional environment 
The pre-1980s rural health services were embedded in the institutions and behavioural norms of the 
command economy. This section describes how this environment has changed and has continued to 
change. 
 
3.1.1 The party-state 2 
The close inter-relationship between the Communist Party and the government has led people to describe 
China’s governance system as a “party-state”. The relationship between party and state and between the 
party-state and other social actors has changed a lot during the reforms. There is a considerable divergence 
between formal organisational structures and actual decision-making processes (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988; Saitch 2001). It is useful to understand how both have changed.  
 
Table 3.1 Levels and governing structure of current Chinese government 
Administrativ
e levels 
Communist 
Party of 
China 
State 
administration 
People’s 
Congress 
Legal system and 
discipline 
Inspection 
Committee of the 
Communist Party 
National Central 
Committee 
State Council and 
the ministries, 
commissions and 
institutions under 
its leadership 
National People’s 
Congress 
National legal and 
discipline 
structures 
Provincial Provincial 
Committee  
Provincial 
government and 
its commissions 
and bureaux 
Provincial People’s 
Congress 
Provincial 
structures 
Prefecture/ 
District 
The prefecture does not constitute a level of political power, but has 
administrative agencies set up by the province 
County County 
Committee 
County 
government and its 
bureaux 
County People’s 
Congress 
County structures 
Town/ 
Township 
Township 
Committee 
Township 
government and its 
departments 
Township People’s 
Congress 
Township 
structures 
 
Source: Fang (2002b). 
                                                 
2  This section draws heavily on Saitch (2001) and Baum and Shevchenko (1999). 
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The major institutions of the party-state include the Communist Party, the State Administration, the 
People’s Congress and the legal system and Discipline Inspection Committee of the Communist Party 
(Table 3.1). This structure is replicated at each administrative level. 
The Constitution assigns to the Communist Party a leading role in all aspects of development. The 
party’s 63 million members are organised in a pyramidal structure on the principle of democratic 
centralism. The pyramid’s peak is the five-yearly National Party Congress (NPC). The 16th Congress took 
place in late 2002. The NPC elects a Central Committee. The Central Committee elects the Politburo and 
the Politburo’s Standing Committee, which lie at the centre of decision-making. There are similar 
structures at each administrative level. The base of the pyramid is made up of 3.5 million primary party 
organisations in work-units, neighbourhoods and villages. 
Between the 1950s and 1970s the party underwent a series of political campaigns aimed at 
maintaining its revolutionary spirit and ideology. It did not institutionalise a rules-based administrative 
system or a permanent bureaucracy (Lu 2000). Since the late 1970s, national policy has focused on 
economic growth. The party has given high priority to improving the technical competence of cadres and 
creating rules to govern their behaviour within the party and in government (Deng 1984; Lee 1991). The 
report by Jiang Zemin (2002) to the 16th Party Congress restates the importance of establishing rules-
based administrative and legal systems. Analysts disagree about the degree to which this objective has 
been achieved. 
The role of party cadres has changed. They have a diminished capacity to interfere directly in the day 
to day management of government or enterprises. On the other hand, many have become involved in 
economic enterprises (Baum and Shevchenko 1999). For example, village party secretaries are often key 
players in local enterprises. These enterprises provide essential revenue for development activities and 
services; they also provide income to managers and/or owners. This pattern is repeated at higher 
administrative levels. It raises questions about how cadres balance their own interests, local interests and 
party policy. 
The government is organised in four tiers and an intermediate administrative level (the prefecture). 
The highest body of the state is the National People’s Congress (NPC). It is elected for five-year terms 
and meets annually. The highest organ of state administration is the State Council, the executive organ of 
the NPC. The work of the State Council is presided over by an executive board composed of the premier, 
vice-premiers, state councillors and the secretary general. Under the State Council are the various 
ministries, commissions, committees, bureaux and ad hoc organisations. Other administrative levels are 
organised similarly into people’s congresses and state administrations. 
Government and party decision-making is organised in a complex matrix with vertical channels (tiao 
tiao) stretching from national ministries all the way to affiliated institutions at the lowest government levels 
and horizontal territorial governing bodies (kuai kuai). In the health sector, for example, the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) formulates plans, guidelines and norms for local health departments and individual health 
facilities, but each level of government decides its own priorities. The relative influence of the two 
principles is difficult to define clearly and changes over time. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) 
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characterise this matrix as a negotiated system in which fragmentation is overcome by negotiation and 
bargaining. They suggest that informal mechanisms and personal relationships play an important 
organising role. 
One characteristic of the reform period is the increasing influence of local administrations. County 
and township governments have a great deal of autonomy from central authorities. The latter establish 
broad development strategies and the legal framework within which localities operate, but local authorities 
have substantial control over resources. Oi (1999) argues that the ability to retain a large proportion of tax 
revenue for local purposes has encouraged local government leaders actively to promote enterprise 
development. This, in turn, has increased their financial autonomy. 
Huang (1995) argues that the centre has compensated for the devolution of administrative and 
financial control by strengthening its capacity to oversee aspects of the party-state. It has improved 
systems for the collection and analysis of data and established a number of policy analysis units to provide 
an overview of development. It has also established the cadre responsibility system, whereby higher levels 
in the party hierarchy appoint local party and government leaders. These cadres sign annual contracts, 
which establish performance targets for the achievement of which they are assessed. The outcome of an 
annual evaluation strongly influences a leader’s remuneration and promotion prospects.  
Localities have followed quite different development trajectories. Some have experienced rapid 
economic growth and established sophisticated welfare systems, including local health insurance (Cook 
1999; Carrin et al. 1999; Zhu 2001). So-called “super-villages” have become centres for economic 
development (Zhe 2000). Other localities have experienced less economic growth and their public services 
have deteriorated. Their governments have had difficulty retaining skilled staff. They impose informal 
levies that put financial burdens on households and local enterprises (Young 1995).  
A number of analysts have commented on the blurred boundaries between state and society. 
Lubman (1999) points to the hazy legal definition of property rights. Wank (2002) documents clientelist 
relationships between enterprise managers and government officials in Xiamen City. Oi and Walder (1999) 
describe a variety of relationships between rural enterprises and local government. In some localities 
enterprises are mostly collectively owned and in others they are mostly private. Oi (1999) argues that the 
behaviour of local administrative bodies strongly influences the performance of local enterprises, whatever 
their ownership structure or their formal relationship with government.  
Baum and Shevchenko (1999) present a typology of four types of party-state involvement in local 
economic activity in China. Entrepreneurial administrations actively seek economic opportunities and 
work closely with economic actors to foster development. Developmental ones encourage economic 
development but do not form ties with preferred enterprises and clients. Clientelist governments link with 
local entrepreneurs, using bureaucratic connections to support local clients. And predatory ones are 
geared to the maximum appropriation of existing, extractable surplus. All four types involve a close inter-
penetration between the party, government and economic actors. The authors do not explain why local 
governments choose to play such different roles. 
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3.1.2 Labour market 
The shift from a managed labour force with low pay and productivity to a market with growing 
differences in earnings between regions and between categories of worker has been a major feature of the 
transition (Tomba 2002). This section focuses on how this has taken place in the public sector. 
When township governments were established, decisions were made about how to treat people who 
had been performing public tasks for the communes. Village health workers were given access to land but 
did not become government employees. Most village health workers now provide care on a fee-for-service 
basis and also work their land. Workers in township health centres became salaried employees with full 
pension entitlements. This led to a differentiation between largely private village clinics and public township 
facilities. County personnel remained in the public sector. 
A number of measures have been taken to improve the quality of cadres and civil servants. They are 
now recruited on the basis of a competitive examination and the Ministry of Personnel manages their 
careers. Most public sector employees are neither civil servants nor cadres. They now work in a system 
that combines aspects of planning and of market relations. The Ministry of Personnel oversees the 
employment of skilled workers with university or college qualifications and the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security oversees the working conditions of semiskilled and unskilled workers. Both Ministries have 
ceased assigning workers to posts. It is difficult to say exactly how employment decisions are made. Many 
local governments influence personnel management directly by requiring facilities to hire more people. 
Employees can change jobs, but facility managers have little power to fire people. The number of staff has 
tended to increase and their workload to diminish. 
The determination of public sector pay has reflected the need to adapt to growing inter-regional 
differences in earnings whilst maintaining an integrated public service. The government sets a national pay 
scale for its employees. However, many local governments do not provide enough money to pay these 
salaries.3 Work units use their revenue to supplement salaries. Successful health facilities pay substantial 
bonuses above the basic salary. Facilities in poor areas don’t even pay basic salaries. The shortfall below 
the national salary was initially experienced as a temporary phenomenon; some health centres recorded 
underpayment of salaries as debt. Expectations have altered and a differentiated pay structure has 
emerged. Employment contracts now embody an explicit or implicit understanding that levels of pay will 
be related to a facility’s financial performance.  
Facilities in poor areas cannot pay enough to retain skilled personnel. Nonetheless, government 
salaries and pension entitlements are high relative to average rural incomes in these localities (World Bank 
2002). Local governments have forced health facilities to employ more staff over the years, although this 
has changed recently. They also finance pensions for retired employees. The retirement age is low and 
many pensioners go into private practice. The pressure to share limited public resources with a growing 
workforce  and  increasing numbers of  pensioners has compromised  the ability of health  facilities to pay 
                                                 
3  A recent study in Gansu Province suggested that some poor townships make no budgetary inputs to the health 
sector at all (World Bank 2002: 119) 
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good salaries to skilled personnel or pay for other inputs necessary for good quality services. Health 
workers frequently supplement their salaries with informal payments by patients (Bloom et al. 2001). Some 
also work privately on a part-time basis. 
The government has two strategies to deal with overstaffing. Central and provincial governments 
have implemented downsizing exercises. These focused mainly on career civil servants and there is little 
evidence of the impact on provincial hospitals. The expectation is that county and township governments 
will implement similar exercises, but it is difficult to assess when they will do so. The other approach is to 
permit uncompetitive work units to shrink, as has happened with state owned enterprises. This approach 
has been tempered by the government’s desire to prevent rapid increases in open unemployment. Also, 
local officials sometimes create jobs for people as a form of patronage. Although there has been talk of 
the privatisation of health facilities, this has not happened on a large scale. 
 
3.1.3 Public finance 
There are large inter-regional differences in public expenditure (Ahmad 1997) According to a recent study 
by the World Bank (2002), inter-provincial variation in per capita expenditure grew substantially in the 
1990s. The same study demonstrated considerable inter-county variation. During the late 1980s and early 
1990s, townships and villages financed an increasing share of expenditure from informal levies that usually 
fell outside of auditing scrutiny by higher levels.  
The devolution of public finance has given advantages to rapidly growing localities. They have been 
able to limit the proportion of tax revenues they transfer to higher levels. They derive much of their 
revenue from informal levies on enterprises. Governments of poor townships, on the other hand, have 
experienced increasing difficulties. They frequently spend more than 80 per cent of their budget on 
salaries and pensions (Zuo 1997). They depend on informal levies on households to meet these costs. 
These levies are often referred to as the three arbitraries: arbitrary taxation, arbitrary fines and arbitrary 
expropriation (Wedeman 2000). These levies are illegal and against the government policy of limiting the 
financial burdens on rural households to 5 per cent of average income.  
There have been numerous protests in localities that have imposed a higher burden on farmers than 
the benefits justified (Bernstein and Lu 2000). The government has made several attempts to reduce these 
burdens. In 1993 it responded to a major protest by abolishing a number of fees and fundraising 
programmes as a means of limiting the financial burdens on households. Despite these measures, many 
localities have continued to collect more than the 5 per cent limit from households. The government is 
introducing reforms aimed at integrating fees into the tax system. These changes will reduce opportunities 
for rent-seeking by local administrations. However, they will also lessen the ability of well-run localities to 
provide additional services. For example, local administrations cannot introduce compulsory local health 
insurance. This highlights the problem the centre faces in trying to meet the needs of the rural population 
in the context of a highly devolved system of public administration over which it has little control. 
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3.1.4 Social organisations 
There is a limited, but growing role for “social organisations” that operate outside direct government 
control (Saitch 2000). According to official registration statistics there were 1,845 nation-wide social 
organisations and 186,666 local organisations in 1996. Saitch (2000) argues that the best way to understand 
the changing relationship between the party-state and social organisations is as an ongoing negotiation. 
In 1998 the State Council issued “Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organisations” to incorporate social organisations more closely within existing party-state structures. 
These regulations require a social organisation to find a sponsoring unit to support an application to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs for registration. The sponsor is responsible for ensuring that the organisation 
meets a need and that its activities are within the law.  
The experience of the All China Women’s Federation (ACWF) illustrates the evolving relationship 
between the party-state and social organisations. The ACWF was established by the Communist Party to 
mobilise women to participate in the implementation of the policies of the party-state (Howell 1995; 
Zhang 1994). It has become increasingly involved in efforts to enable local women to develop productive 
enterprises. It also has made efforts to create local representative structures, with variable success (Jacka 
1997). However, control by government officials of the budget and appointment of senior staff has 
constrained the autonomy of local branches. The limited role of the ACLW is demonstrated by an opinion 
poll that showed that most women would not seek its support when faced by a serious problem (Howell 
1996). 
A wide variety of organisations have been established without a formal relationship with the state. 
Saitch (2000) estimates there were around a million in 1996. Zhang (1994) describes informal women’s 
organisations that have emerged in rural areas. Zhou (1996) mentions the rise of guilds, mutual aid 
societies and other forms of organisation for mutual economic benefit. These organisations tend to be 
local and to focus on specific problems and issues. 
Saitch (2000) identifies several factors that are likely to reduce government’s capacity to control social 
organisations. These include the decision to downsize government and the role of social organisations as 
sources of employment for laid-off bureaucrats, the pressure on these organisations to identify alternatives 
to public funding, and the limited regulatory capacity of government departments. Many organisations 
simply do not register and remain informal groups. He concludes that the state has retained a great deal of 
influence over social organisations but that some social space has been opened up.  
 
3.1.5 Rural institutions of local accountability 
The government has established new mechanisms to enable rural people to express their grievances and 
influence local power holders. These include elected village committees, public petitioning of higher level 
officials about corrupt behaviour by local cadres and the introduction of rule by law and access by citizens 
to courts (Zweig 2000).  
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is responsible for the introduction and oversight of village elections. 
The process began with the enactment of the provisional law on village committees in 1987; all provinces 
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had their own regulations by 1994 and the government enacted a definitive law in 1998 (Louie 2001). A 
village committee consists of a chairman, vice-chairman and other members (a total of three to seven 
members). They are elected for three-year terms by secret ballot of those aged 18 and above. The village 
committee answers to an assembly of village residents. Financial matters must be made public at least six-
monthly. Village committees are not part of the state bureaucracy. According to the 1998 law, the 
Communist Party should assume a ‘core leading function’, which implies that the elected committee is 
subordinated to the party. The actual relationship between the party and the committee varies from place 
to place (Kelliher 1997).  
There are different opinions about the impact of these measures. Some suggest that elected village 
leaders are more likely to challenge township officials who act outside the law (O’Brien and Li 1996). 
O’Brien and Li (1995) state that the number of letters of complaint about local government increased 
during the early 1990s. They argue that this reflected both the magnitude of problems with local 
governance and the opportunities for influence that village elections and the appraisal of the performance 
of government leaders (cadre responsibility system) created. They suggest that this form of protest is most 
successful where it exposes violations of government policy and where higher government officials are 
interested in improving the performance of local leaders. Li (2001) presents the results of a survey that 
shows that residents of localities where local elections were seen to be free and fair were more likely to say 
they would ask village leaders for help when problems arise.  
Edin (2000) emphasises the importance of the cadre responsibility system and the high priority given 
by the political leadership to social stability in creating opportunities for protest letters and the views of 
elected village leaders to have an influence. Louie (2001) cautions that many villages have not 
implemented the law fully either because they have not yet held elections or because local party structures 
strongly influence the outcome. This has limited the impact of this initiative. 
The report of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection to the 16th Congress (CPC 2002b) 
emphasises the importance of so-called democratic supervision in stating that ‘the practice of ordinary 
people appraising the services of every sector has been adopted as a general rule’ (p125). It also proposes 
‘developing democracy, improving the legal system and putting the exercise of power under effective 
supervision and restraint’ (p146). These statements suggest that the government will continue to rely on a 
combination of supervision from above and strengthening of local accountability mechanisms to make 
local governments more responsive to the population. 
A number of authors emphasise the influence of informal networks on individuals and institutions 
(Gold et al. 2002; Yan 1996). They use the term “guanxi” to denote a set of inter-personal relationships 
based on mutual obligations. An important characteristic of guanxi is that people exchange gifts as a way 
to establish long-standing obligations. Guanxi is often associated with human feelings and shared ethical 
norms (Kipnis 2002; Yan 1996).  
It is widely agreed that guanxi networks became particularly important during the social disruption 
associated with the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. There is less agreement on how these networks 
have adapted to the transition to a socialist market economy. Some argue that guanxi is becoming less 
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important as national rules-based systems are consolidated. Others argue that greater mobility, improved 
communications and increased economic opportunities have encouraged people to extend their networks 
beyond their village or work unit (Yan 1996; Zhou 1996; Lin 2002). Yan (1996) cites examples where 
villagers used guanxi networks to force officials to correct wrong behaviour and to bypass bureaucratic 
obstructions. Several people have documented the importance of networks of mutual obligation in urban 
areas (Gold et al. 2002; Wank 2002). Some argue that as networks have become extended, the exchange of 
gifts is more instrumental and less associated with long-term relationships and concomitant behavioural 
norms. 
 
3.2 The management of change 
The government strategy for managing reform has been to define certain fixed and non-negotiable rules 
and permit a wide variety of behaviours concerning most other matters. The fixed points include the 
primacy of the Communist Party, the maintenance of social stability and national unity and the prohibition 
against certain criminal activities. The party-state enforces the non-negotiable rules with repressive force 
and severe punishment for transgressors. This section concerns the management of change outside these 
boundaries. It does not consider the debates within the political leadership about where these boundaries 
should be drawn (Fewsmith 1999) 
China’s leaders describe the management of reform as crossing a stream whilst feeling for the stones. 
This is a graphic metaphor for the tentative nature of decision-making in China (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988). The usual process involves the gradual construction of consensus at national and 
provincial levels in favour of a new policy. The initial government proclamations often state general 
principles, rather than specific and enforceable regulations. These general statements may evolve into 
specific rules, or they may be altered or disregarded.  
The evolution of a policy statement into a change in the rules of behaviour for local governments 
and economic actors is lengthy and complex. Local governments translate national policies into local 
regulations. Some localities may ignore a policy or implement it unenthusiastically. While the evolution is 
taking place there is a great deal of ambiguity about what constitutes acceptable behaviour. 
Individuals and local institutions play an active role in developing new forms of relationship and 
norms of behaviour. Zhou (1996) argues that many changes have been driven by a myriad of local 
adaptations by individual farmers in response to new opportunities. A variety of social organisations and 
networks have emerged during the reforms. Potter (2002) suggests that these networks provide a 
framework for stable relationships between members, despite the lack of confidence in the performance 
of relatively new rules-based systems. He suggests that formal systems and informal networks are likely to 
co-exist for a considerable amount of time. Potter focuses on the positive aspects of networks. Others 
point out that they promote the interests of members at the expense of non-members, to the detriment of 
the consolidation of universal rules. This is particularly important during a period when new forms of 
social segmentation are emerging and becoming institutionalised. 
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China’s transition can be understood as a series of local adaptations punctuated by changes to legal 
and institutional arrangements. The national government articulates broad development objectives and 
establishes a framework within which stakeholders adapt (Liu and Bloom 2002). Local leaders have a lot 
of leeway in translating policies into new practices (Lichtenstein 1993; Oi 1999; Shue 1988). Local 
stakeholders (enterprises, workers, farmers and so forth) test boundaries and re-negotiate relationships 
within the policy framework. This approach permits small-scale experiments with reform before the 
government alters the legal framework (Kelliher 1992). Government adapts policies to take into account 
successful innovations. 
Whiting (2000) illustrates how this has worked with regard to the relationship between enterprises 
and local governments. She shows how different historical legacies led the governments of three eastern 
counties to evolve different relationships with enterprises. She also shows how growing decentralisation 
and the increased autonomy of enterprises contributed to a fall in tax flows to higher levels of 
government. National authorities responded to this fall in the mid-1990s by reforming tax and rules for 
enterprise ownership to reduce opportunities for this form of game playing. She points out that these 
reforms altered the rules of engagement between local government and enterprise and should lead to 
further evolution. She concludes that we need to develop a greater understanding of the politics of 
transition management. 
Bloom et al. (2001) make a similar point about health worker pay. They describe how health facilities 
and individual workers have tried a variety of strategies for increasing earnings. Some strategies push 
against the boundaries of accepted practice. These include selling unregulated goods and services and 
soliciting informal payments from patients, drug companies and suppliers of medical services. The 
government identifies illegal practices and punishes transgressors harshly. It imposes less serious penalties 
for unethical practices, such as the acceptance of informal payments. It alters the legal framework, from 
time to time, to institutionalise practices that have become established. This process has enabled health 
worker pay to adapt to growing inequalities between localities and between categories of worker, without 
explicitly breaking with the concept of a national public service and associated understandings about 
appropriate norms of behaviour. It has allowed new behavioural norms to emerge. Some argue that the 
growth in inter-regional inequality will eventually make it impossible to maintain a national pay scale 
(World Bank 2002). It will then be particularly important that other principles have been accepted for 
establishing appropriate levels of pay and establishing ethical and legal rules of behaviour.  
There is a language in China, which contrasts hardware (buildings, trained personnel and so forth) 
with software (systems). The latter includes the attitudes and understandings of local stakeholders. The 
Deputy Mayor of a poor rural prefecture stressed the importance of software at a recent meeting about a 
health reform and development project. He referred to three imbalances in implementation: (i) progress in 
rehabilitating infrastructure contrasted with delays in reforming institutions; (ii) different understandings 
by officials at various levels of government of the meaning of reform and (iii) persistence amongst service 
providers of attitudes relevant to a command economy.  
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The government treads a fine line in changing the legal framework during a major transition. If it 
enacts laws that do not reflect local realities people will ignore them and live outside the formal 
framework. This can erode respect for rules and weaken constraints to opportunistic behaviour. If 
government delays institutionalising new relationships for too long, it prolongs a vagueness that 
encourages stakeholders to pursue strategies for short-term gain. The lack of clear rules creates high 
transaction costs. It may lead to sub-optimal outcomes because people have little assurance that particular 
social arrangements will persist. Zhang (2000) argues, for example, that the lack of a clear regulatory and 
fiscal framework for village institutions has become a constraint to the development of local services. 
Bloom and Tang (1999) argue similarly with regard to local health insurance.  
The creation of new social arrangements is complicated by the need to reconcile the interests of 
different localities, age cohorts and employment groups in a situation of rapidly increasing inequality. 
White (1996) suggests that popular discontent about corruption is largely fuelled by a widely held view 
that certain groups have benefited unfairly from the reforms. Zweig (2000) argues that trusted 
mechanisms to mediate conflicts of interest have become an important element of a strategy for managing 
change whilst preserving social stability. Two recent publications highlight new thinking in China about 
these issues (CASS 1998, 2000). They implicitly acknowledge the political aspects of transition. Li Peilin 
(2002) argues that ‘it is essential for future sustainable development in China to bring about a reasonable order of social 
stratification with the aid of the legal system’ (p45).  
 
3.3 Creation of rules based administrative and legal systems 
Since the late 1970s China’s political leaders have repeatedly said they wanted to create rules-based 
administrative and legal systems. Several commentators view this as a necessary response to the 
emergence of a market economy (Nee 1989; Huang 1995). The demand for complex arrangements to 
meet social needs has made it particularly important that government develop a regulatory capacity. This 
involves defining clear boundaries between individual, local and national interests, establishing competent 
implementing agencies at all tiers of government and altering the understandings and expectations of key 
actors.4 It also involves convincing government officials to act in the public interest. 
There is a tension between the wish to establish a clearly defined legal framework and China’s 
strategy for transition management. This strategy has involved encouraging individuals, work units and 
local governments to push against existing boundaries and explore new working arrangements. It has 
resulted in a variety of networks of relationships operating under fuzzy rules of behaviour that differ 
between localities. In some localities this has been widely beneficial and in others it has not.  
One source of difficulty in establishing rules-based systems is that institutional and economic 
arrangements are changing more quickly that the ability of political leaders or the population to 
                                                 
4  A recent article by Hu Angang (2002) identifies the five aspects of building honest politics and administration 
as: reform of Communist Party, strengthen monitoring by people’s congress, strengthen independent judicial 
system, strengthen financial audits, and establish a standardised civil service with strong sanctions against 
corruption. 
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understand them. Tomba (2002) illustrates in a study of the emergence of a labour market. He describes 
three phases: decentralisation (giving more independence to economic actors), informalisation (market-
driven experiments) and institutionalisation (transformation of successful experiments into policies). He 
shows how systematic descriptions lagged behind the changing reality. Tomba’s chronology neglects the 
considerable investment in effort and time required to translate policies into effective changes in the 
behaviour of the party-state. This involves repeated iterations between policy discussions and creation of 
new institutions. 
Lubman (1999) highlights the important influence of the attitudes of government officials and the 
population on the performance of rules based systems. The former have to understand and accept their 
role as public servants and the latter need to have stable expectations of how the system will perform 
and/or ought to perform. Lubman focuses on the development of a rights consciousness and a 
willingness to use the courts. Lin (2002) alludes to the more general need to achieve social agreement on 
moral norms to replace the egalitarian emphasis on the social good under the command economy. The 
highly emotional protests against certain forms of corruption suggest that there is a consensus that certain 
forms of behaviour are bad. However, there is a great deal of ambiguity about where to draw the line in 
mediating individual, local (work units, geographic, guanxi networks) and social interests.  
Some analysts of local networks emphasise their role in establishing local moral norms. Yan (1996) 
suggests there is a continuum of guanxi relationships that extends from exchanges of gifts linked to 
strongly felt ethical norms amongst long-term members of networks to a variety of instrumental 
exchanges of gifts in exchange for a specific favour. He provides a fascinating insight into the nuanced 
moral judgements people make in discussing how villagers view the payment of gifts to officials for 
different purposes. They thought it was appropriate to give gifts to facilitate purchase of scarce materials 
but frowned on the use of gifts to secure a place in college for a family member. 
We need to understand transition as a long process of creation of a framework of institutions and 
behavioural norms appropriate to a market economy. This process is neither a top-down imposition of a 
new framework of enforceable rules, nor a bottom-up construction of new beliefs and institutional 
realities. Rather, it can be viewed as an interaction between a powerful party-state that is actively codifying 
rules and establishing institutions to enforce them and locally constructed relationships between 
individuals, institutions and governments. The following sub-sections illustrate how this interaction works. 
The first illustrates how government has implemented a new set of rules to control pollution through a 
combination of strategic leadership from above and organised pressure from below. The second looks at 
the complex interaction between government rule-setting and individual and local actions in the attempt 
to create mechanisms to define and deter corrupt behaviour. 
 
3.3.1 Creation of regulations: the case of pollution control 
The measures to control pollution illustrate some issues involved in the establishment of a regulatory 
capacity. Wang (2000) outlines how they were introduced. The centre began by issuing broad regulations. 
During the early 1980s it became clear that local governments and enterprises did not take these 
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regulations seriously. Environmental regulators formulated a strategy to change this. The State Council 
issued regulations in 1982 that required firms to pay a fine if their discharges did not meet standards. By 
1996 all cities and counties had adopted them.  
The system works as follows. Local environmental protection bureaux collect fines from polluters 
and use the revenue to finance their activities and support environmental projects (including pollution 
control by enterprises). A firm can request a remission of up to 80 per cent of its levy to subsidise 
investment in pollution reduction. A study by Wang and Wheeler (1996) suggests that these measures 
have been quite effective.  
Several studies have explored the role of community pressure in pushing local governments to take 
pollution seriously. Local environment control bureaux receive hundreds of thousands of complaints each 
year. Studies purport to show that these complaints have resulted in more inspections (Wang et al. 2002), 
higher pollution charges (Wang and Wheeler 1999) and less air pollution (Dasgupta et al. 1996). Wang 
(2000) cites cases where government decided to act against an offending enterprise in response to pressure 
by citizen groups and written complaints from the public. 
The example of pollution control illustrates how government can establish a regulatory capacity 
when there is a consensus in favour at national level and when a national body plays an active leadership 
role. Three factors contributed to the relative success of the pollution discharge levy. First, the regulatory 
body is independent of the entities it is regulating and has no institutional links with them. Second, local 
regulators have an incentive to implement the discharge levies, which provide funding for their activities. 
Third, communities have actively pushed for enforcement.  
The regulation of pollution varies between localities. Some local governments have colluded with 
enterprises to weaken implementation and reduce the size of the levy. Pollution standards vary between 
localities and there is virtually no regulation in remote rural areas. This illustrates the limited power of 
vertical structures and the importance of local government (Wang 2002). The studies did not assess the 
degree to which officials of environment protection bureaux have used pollution levies to further their 
personal interest or the specific interests of the regulatory agency. 
 
3.3.2 Reducing opportunistic behaviour and inappropriate use of power 
Both the general public and the political leadership have repeatedly voiced concern about the need to 
establish clean government and combat corruption. The government’s approach follows the international 
consensus understanding of corruption as a principal-agent problem (Goudie and Stasavage 1997). This 
refers to the need to ensure that individuals and institutions use regulatory powers on behalf of society, as 
represented by the government. The report by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 
16th Party Congress stresses the need to define clear rules of behaviour, create systems to identify and 
punish transgressors and, where possible, reduce opportunities for rent-seeking by replacing 
administrative mechanisms with the market (CPC 2002b).  
Several analysts argue that the form of opportunistic behaviour in China can be traced to the inter-
penetration of the party-state and the economy during the period of the command economy prior to the 
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late 1970s (Lu 2000; Gold et al. 2002). At that time political leaders were opposed to fixed and formal 
bureaucratic rules so that individuals and work units tended to rely on informal (non-market) 
arrangements. The government mobilised the population in periodic anti-corruption campaigns. The 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable economic behaviour varied over time. But, there were 
limited opportunities for personal enrichment.  
Since that time the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour have become fuzzier 
and there are many more opportunities for economic gain. The government ended its ideological 
opposition to market-oriented activities and carried out intensive propaganda during the early 1980s to 
convince people that this change was permanent (Nee 1989). It did not clearly define the line between 
appropriate and inappropriate money-making strategies (Lin 2002). On the contrary, it encouraged 
individuals, work units and local governments to develop innovative forms of relationship to foster 
economic growth. This further blurred the boundaries between state and non-state concerns, property and 
interests (Lubman 1999).  
Public attitudes seem not to distinguish clearly between acceptable and unacceptable activities. Lu 
(2000) mentions a commonly held view that the volume of exchanges and gifts to secure guanxi has 
increased greatly. Several analysts suggest that an increasing number of such transactions are instrumental, 
without an associated emotional and ethical dimension. Schramm and Taube (2003) draw a parallel 
between the roles of guanxi networks in China and social networks in other countries in ensuring security 
of interpersonal agreements in the context of a weak legal system. They argue that these forms of 
reciprocal relationships have been important to the success of the reforms. White (1996) concurs, but 
points out that the important development question is whether this kind of informal arrangement will 
continue to be economically productive in the long term. He points out that one person’s lubricant to 
economic activity is another person’s unfair use of personal connections. 
White (1996) describes a continuum of opportunistic activities. At one extreme are practices that are 
‘clearly illegal in formal terms and involve a personal or group infringement of institutional rules for purely 
private purposes’. In the middle are activities by institutions to use their powers and special knowledge for 
their own interests. At the other end are the inter-personal networks of reciprocity and guanxi. There is a 
clear consensus that the first type of activity is illegitimate and should be punished harshly. This consensus 
is revealed in a number of surveys and public protests. There is less agreement about where to draw 
boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in other trade-offs between personal, 
institutional and social interests. These boundaries are constantly being negotiated in public attitudes and 
in government policies. For example, work units often maintain separate sets of books for government 
and internal use. Individuals are encouraged to generate income on behalf of their employer, but they also 
develop personal livelihood strategies. Local governments act to minimise taxes remitted to higher levels 
of government and increase their own revenue (Lichtenstein 1993).  
In the late 1970s the political leadership ended its reliance on mass mobilisation to control 
opportunistic behaviour and said it intended to establish rules-based systems. The party-state has created 
control and supervisory systems and encouraged the population to complain about those who break the 
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rules. These systems include the Discipline Inspection Committee of the Communist Party, government 
auditors and the legal apparatus. It has issued a number of rules and regulations. Since 1994 many local 
governments have carried out annual evaluations of civil servants to identify incompetence or dishonesty. 
The measures to create elected village committees and encourage people to submit written complaints 
about the misbehaviour of officials have contributed to the anti-corruption effort. 
There are indications that opportunistic behaviour persists, despite high profile cases in which 
corrupt individuals were harshly punished. Li (2001b) reports a survey of rural residents that found little 
confidence in present measures to control corruption. The reports to the 16th Party Congress reveal 
concern at the highest level (Jiang 2002; CPC 2002b). The persistence of blurred boundaries between 
individual, local and social interests and of doubt in the capacity of the state to control opportunistic 
behaviour is a major constraint to the establishment of rules based systems. It is likely that formal systems 
will coexist with informal local networks for a long time. The tension between individual, local and 
national interests will continue to be an important factor in future institutional development. 
 
4  Reconstructing rural health systems 
The government acknowledges that rural health services have serious problems (Li 2002). It has 
articulated the following vision of a reconstructed system (State Council 1997a/b): all facilities provide 
competent services, preventive programmes reach most of the population, there are functioning referral 
and supervision systems, drugs and diagnostic tests are used rationally, government is an important source 
of health finance, local health insurance protects families against the cost of serious illness and special 
measures ensure access to essential health services for the poor. A major policy statement in 2002 
confirms this vision (CPC 2002a).  
This section argues that health systems perform well only within an appropriate institutional 
framework. As the institutional arrangements and the social attitudes associated with the pre-reform 
period changed, the health system became increasingly decentralised and informalised. The reconstruction 
of an effective health system depends on the establishment of effective management systems, appropriate 
regulation and new behavioural norms. The performance of the health system can be viewed as an 
indicator of the functioning of the regulatory state. 
This section draws on Mackintosh’s (1999) argument that rules and sanctions are complemented in 
most health systems by implicit agreements between stakeholders. She emphasises the influence of shared 
understandings and expectations on health system performance. She refers to the importance of a service 
ethic in which health workers act in the interests of patients and receive high social status in exchange. She 
points out that governments cannot create these understandings through legislation, alone. They also need 
to foster informal understandings that reinforce ethical and professional behaviour. Lindelow and 
Wagstaff (2003) make a similar point in discussing the multiplicity of factors that influence health provider 
performance. 
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Figure 4.1 The vicious circle in rural health services in poor localities 
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Many health facilities in rural China are caught in a vicious circle of rising costs and falling quality (Figure 
4.1). They are under pressure to increase salaries. They cannot attract enough patients. They compensate 
by selling more drugs and providing more clinical tests. This raises their costs and reduces demand. Users 
and providers of services lose from this situation. If users do not trust local facilities, they are likely to 
choose the cheapest provider for minor illnesses and attend hospital for serious problems. Government is 
reluctant to increase funding for service providers it does not trust. Competent local practitioners find it 
difficult to earn a good living. The best seek employment in urban hospitals. 
Older health workers tend to have attitudes formed before the reforms. Younger workers are less 
likely to be influenced by the previous ethic of public service. If that is so, the constraints to opportunistic 
behaviour could diminish and the vicious circle could worsen. The challenge for policy-makers and local 
managers is to construct an institutional environment and set of expectations that transforms the vicious 
circle into a virtuous one, whereby health workers meet their economic and social aspirations by providing 
good quality services that people need. This involves changes to formal rules and implicit contracts 
between stakeholders.  
In order to overcome the tendency towards a vicious circle, the rural health system has to re-establish 
the functional relationships in Figure 2.1. However, they need to be embodied in institutional 
arrangements appropriate to the new reality (Bloom 2001). These arrangements are likely to differ 
between localities, which also have quite different patterns of enterprise ownership and government-
enterprise relationships. Whatever form they take, they need to fulfil the following conditions: 
 
• relevant actors know their roles and have the capacity to play them;  
• stakeholders understand the rules of behaviour and mostly can meet their aspirations by conforming 
to them; and  
• it is widely assumed that most people will follow the rules.  
18 
4.1 Actors in the rural health system 
This section describes the principal actors in the rural health sector, drawing on the previous analysis of 
China’s evolving institutional structure.  
 
4.1.1 The party-state 
The Communist Party, People’s Congress and State Administration for township, county, prefecture and 
provincial levels play roles in the rural health system. Most have not given health much priority. However, 
the proposal that health be included amongst the targets for judging the performance of cadres and 
government officials may encourage them to support the health sector more actively (CPC 2002a).  
The rural health system is organised along vertical and horizontal lines. Each administrative level 
controls its own institutions. The provincial level controls a number of referral hospitals as well as 
institutions responsible for planning, monitoring and supervising province-wide programmes. The 
provincial hospitals provide services to provincial government employees, residents of the provincial 
capital and others who can pay. The Provincial Health Department can influence institutions belonging to 
lower levels, but through indirect means. The pattern is replicated at lower levels. 
The recent history of the township health centres illustrates the fluctuating balance between the 
vertical and horizontal principles. During the 1980s the government devolved control of these facilities to 
township governments. These governments provided funding, controlled personnel and supervised 
performance. The county health bureaux retained responsibility for technical supervision but without 
direct powers over facility managers. A number of problems emerged related to weak management 
capacity and poor governance of township administrations (Tang and Bloom 2001). The most recent 
government rural health policy recommends that control of health centres revert to county health bureaux 
(CPC 2002a).  
Many commissions and ministries have health-related mandates for planning, service provision, 
finance, regulation and accountability (Table 4.1). The State Development Planning Commission oversees 
the formulation and implementation of the five-year plan and special public sector investment 
programmes and the Ministry of Finance is responsible for annual budgets and monitoring of financial 
management.  
The Ministry of Health is responsible for government health facilities, several other ministries “own” 
health facilities or oversee enterprises that do so and the State Family Planning Commission has a network 
of service delivery institutions. The Ministry of Health provides annual grants to government health 
institutes and facilities and it manages a health insurance scheme for government employees. The Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security is responsible for urban health insurance and the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
funds safety nets for the poor. The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for limiting the financial burden 
on farmers. 
The Ministry of Health, oversees the performance of its facilities and regulates private providers. The 
State Drug Management and Monitoring Bureau is responsible for ensuring that drugs are effective and 
safe. The Ministry of Personnel manages civil servants and also skilled workers in public employment. The 
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Ministry of Labour and Social Security plays a similar role regarding semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 
The Price Bureau, under the State Development Planning Commission, sets prices for health services and 
health-related commodities. The Ministry of Civil Affairs oversees the elected village committees and 
social organisations. The auditing administration establishes rules for financial audit. 
 
Table 4.1 Government organisations with an influence on health 
Ministry of Commission Principal health-related functions 
Planning 
State Development Planning Commission Responsible for five-year plan and also special 
public sector investment programmes 
Ministry of Finance - Annual budget 
Service Provision 
Ministry of Health - Responsible for the performance of health 
institutions 
State Family Planning Commission - Implementation of family planning policy 
Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of 
Railways and other sector ministries 
- Health facilities that serve sector employees or 
are owned by work units under the sector 
Finance 
Ministry of Health - Partial subsidies of public health facilities 
- Health insurance for government employees 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security - Urban health insurance 
Ministry of Civil Affairs - Safety net for the poor 
Ministry of Agriculture - Represents interests of farmers in preventing 
excessive financial burdens 
Regulation and accountability 
Ministry of Health - Enforce health-related regulations 
Ministry of Personnel - Management of civil servants and cadres 
- Oversight of public sector employment of skilled 
workers 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security - Oversight of public sector employment of semi-
skilled and unskilled workers 
Price Bureau of State Development Planning 
Commission 
- Sets prices of services and health-related 
commodities 
State Drug Management and Monitoring Bureau - Enforce regulation of pharmaceutical sector 
- Oversee government pharmaceutical companies 
and distribution systems 
Ministry of Civil Affairs - Oversight of elected village committees and of 
social organisations 
Auditing Administration - Financial Audit 
 
Only a few types of social organisations are involved in rural health activities. One type represents 
providers, including the Association of Health Centre Managers and associations representing different 
categories of health worker. Another type represents users of services. For example, the ACWF has a 
mandated role in rural health according to the ‘two guidelines and one law’ (Chinese women development 
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guidelines, Chinese children development guideline and the law on protecting women’s rights and 
interests). Some local informal organisations have become involved in health. For example, Zhang (1994) 
describes an organisation in Hubei Province, which collected money from its members for a free annual 
check-up. 
Local accountability structures have mostly paid little attention to health. The recent government 
policy on rural health may change this by ensuring that health is included in the indicators for assessing 
the performance of local leaders (CPC 2002a). If the argument of O’Brien and Li (1995) is correct, and 
actions by village leaders and organised communities have been most effective when in support of 
government priorities, local structures may become more interested in health issues. The SARS epidemic 
is likely to heighten local interest in health. 
Little is known about the influence of informal networks on the behaviour of providers and users of 
health services. It is likely that the frequently observed preference for village-based doctors and midwives 
over the township health centres reflects the high levels of trust in local residents. However, we know 
little about the attitudes of different categories of health worker or of rural residents about what 
constitutes ethical behaviour and how it is enforced. 
 
4.2 The relationship between local government and health facilities 
Local governments have changed their relationship with health facilities following similar changes in their 
relationship with productive enterprises. Half the village health stations are privately owned and many 
others are leased by health workers from the village. Directors of county and township facilities sign 
management contracts with the local government, which specify basic performance targets. They largely 
control the use of financial surpluses and the organisation of services (Chen et al. 1997). These forms of 
ownership and management resemble township and village enterprises and county government owned 
enterprises.  
Health has lagged behind other sectors in reducing direct government controls. The government still 
provides budget support, sets prices and strongly influences personnel management. Wu (2002) refers to a 
semi-market economy in which facility managers seek economic advantage in an environment with many 
aspects of the command economy.  
One feature of the health sector is the persistence of price control. There is little systematic 
information on how prices are set. The Price Bureau has kept charges for consultations and inpatient days 
low and has compensated providers by permitting them to earn profits from selling drugs and by setting 
quite high prices for the use of sophisticated equipment. A number of studies have shown that this 
arrangement encourages health facilities to provide a costly form of care (Liu 1999). Despite this evidence, 
local governments have not fundamentally changed the system of payment for services. One reason may 
be that some stakeholders benefit from the present system. 
Drug suppliers and the State Drug Management and Monitoring Bureau benefit from the high 
volume of drug consumption (Dong et al. 1999). It would appear that wholesale prices have been kept 
high. One indicator of this is that drug suppliers often give discounts to health facilities and sometimes 
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pay kickbacks to individual employees (Bloom et al. 2001). Wu (2002) suggests that hospital managers and 
health workers have substantial opportunities for rent-seeking. The report to the 16th Party Congress of 
the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection proposes the use of competitive tender for drugs to 
reduce these opportunities (CPC 2002b: 125). It also mentions regulation of drug production and licensing 
of drug sellers. It does not mention measures to reduce over-prescription of drugs.  
A second feature of the health sector is the continuing involvement of government in human 
resource management. Health facility managers cannot fire employees. Local governments put pressure on 
them to employ personnel. The government’s strategy for tackling the problem of overstaffing is to 
rationalise public sector employment. Central and provincial levels have reduced their staff, but there is 
little evidence that counties and townships are doing the same.  
The government is exploring options to reform facility ownership and give them more autonomy 
from direct government control (Li Changming 2002). The recent rural health policy favours a 
competitive system for the appointment of health facility managers (CPC 2002a). The policy does not 
define clearly the implications of such reforms for an increased need for government regulation. The 
following section describes some measures being taken to make health facilities more responsive to the 
needs of the community. 
 
4.3 Increasing government involvement 
The new policy advocates increased government involvement in financing and regulating rural health 
services and in making them more accountable to the population. 
 
4.3.1 Financing health services 
The government funds rural health services through health budgets and as part of poverty alleviation and 
social protection programmes (Table 4.2). Government health budgets are low. A study of 28 poor 
counties in 7 provinces in 1996 found that their governments spent between 6.8 and 20.2 rmb5 per capita 
on health services (Hicks et al. 1998). This money financed public health services and health insurance for 
employees of the county government. The same study found that four counties in Qinghai Province spent 
29 per cent of their health budgets on government health insurance, which covered a small proportion of 
the counties’ population. 
Township health centres and county hospitals receive between 5–25 per cent of their budgets from 
government grants.6 Some township facilities have also received money from the three-items construction 
programme to pay a share of the cost of construction and equipment. Local governments and the 
facilities, themselves, finance the balance of these investments (Liu and Bloom 2002).  
                                                 
5  This is equivalent to between $0.82 and $2.45 per capita. 
6  The World Bank (2002) refers to a township in Gansu that did not provide any funding to the local health 
centre. 
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The Ministry of Civil Affairs funds social relief for the very poor, but only a tiny proportion of this 
money is for health care. The large government poverty alleviation programmes provide some funding for 
health through their support for public sector investment and their provision of soft loans for small-scale 
private investments.  
 
Table 4.2 Social sources of rural hospital finance 
Government budgets 
Ministry of Health Government budgetary allocation may account for between 10–25% of 
total hospital expenditure 
Government health insurance reimburses a share of the cost of health 
care for government employees 
Ministry of Civil Affairs - Minimal payment of medical expenses of the poor 
- The new government policy favours the creation of a medical financial 
scheme for the rural poor 
State Development 
Planning Commission 
- Three-items construction programme provided investment funds for 
township health centres 
Poverty Alleviation 
Programme 
- Support for construction of health facilities as part of poverty reduction 
programme 
Other collective arrangements 
Labour Insurance - Enterprise employees may be covered by a health insurance scheme 
Cooperative Medical 
Schemes 
Local schemes that derive revenue from government, enterprises and 
voluntary household contributions.  
Schemes reimburse a proportion of the cost of medical care. 
The new policy commits central government to provide 10 yuan per 
capita to counties in the Western part of the country, which establish 
schemes. 
 
Each level of government provides its employees with health insurance, managed by its health 
department. Most schemes pay on a fee-for-service basis, with beneficiaries making co-payments. County 
government employees mostly attend county-level facilities. State owned enterprises finance a health 
benefit for their employees. These schemes also reimburse a proportion of expenditure at designated 
facilities. Members of such schemes are likely to attend county level facilities, as well. Consequently, a 
significant number of patients at county hospitals are covered by health insurance. 
During the period of the command economy most communes established cooperative medical 
schemes, which reimbursed a proportion of the cost of health care (Feng et al. 1997). Most of these 
schemes collapsed after the introduction of the household responsibility system. Some localities 
maintained their schemes and others established new ones. They are funded through a combination of 
voluntary contributions and modest grants from local government. The successful schemes are mostly in 
localities that have achieved rapid social, economic and institutional development. Their success depends 
on the ability of local government to generate funds from enterprises and the ability of government and 
communities to ensure that schemes use money in the interest of their members and are seen to do so.  
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A number of poor localities have tried to establish schemes. People have been reluctant to join them, 
despite spending a lot of money on health care. The reasons include the high cost and low quality of 
services in health centres, poor management of funds and the disincentives for the young and healthy to 
contribute (Bloom and Tang 1999). Ye et al. (2001) and Wang et al. (2001) interviewed local government 
officials and Communist Party cadres in counties with experimental schemes. They concluded that one 
factor that jeopardised the sustainability of these schemes was a lack of trust between the community, 
local government and health facilities.  
There has been a lot of debate about whether local administrations should be allowed to introduce 
compulsory local health insurance (Liu et al. 1996; Carrin et al. 1999). The health sector has supported this 
idea as a way to increase demand and share risk (State Council 1997b). Others have opposed it on the 
grounds that poorly designed and managed schemes would impose unnecessary financial burdens on rural 
households (Du 2000). The most recent government policy supports the establishment of schemes but 
only if contributions are voluntary (CPC 2002a). 
The 2002 rural health policy makes several proposals for increasing government funding of rural 
health services. They include larger local government health budgets, special transfers of resources from 
higher levels of government to support health services in poor localities, a health safety net and transfers 
of central government money earmarked for CMS schemes in Western China. Local governments will 
have to address a number of issues in attempting to translate this policy into changes in rural health 
services. 
One major difficulty is the present system of public sector financial management. Wang (2002) 
illustrates with the example of three poor counties in Gansu. They spent a large proportion of their 
budgets on salaries. They allocated their limited resources preferentially for this purpose, on the basis of 
numbers of personnel. A few people in the finance department decided on the allocation of non-salary 
expenditure, with little consultation with sector managers. They often did not know how much money 
was available until late in the year, because higher levels of government did not finalise the amount they 
transferred to lower levels until they were certain about their own financial position. This form of financial 
management makes it difficult to ensure that additional resources would be specifically allocated for 
improving health services. Also, health facility managers have considerable autonomy in deciding how to 
allocate resources between salaries and other items.  
The new policy encourages local governments to establish CMS schemes and promises that central 
government will contribute 10 yuan per capita to schemes in poor counties. This will provide a financial 
incentive for people to join CMS. The policy also identifies the need to protect the rural poor against the 
financial burden of major illness. The Ministry of Civil Affairs is likely to increase funding for some form 
of health safety net. The challenge will be to design management and monitoring systems to ensure that 
additional funding for these two schemes is used mostly to improve access to appropriate services. There 
is a danger that providers will increase prices and/or encourage higher sales of drugs to increase their 
incomes. 
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There are debates about how additional social funding should be channelled to health service 
providers. Some argue that local health departments give too much weight to the interests of health 
workers. That is one reason why the government gave control over urban health insurance to the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security. Some advocates of an increase in public funding of rural health services call 
for a similar split in rural areas (Liu 2000; Du 2000). For example, the Ministry of Finance seems to favour 
purchasing of services from township and village level providers. It is not clear who would do this 
purchasing and what measures could be taken to ensure that they were competent and acting in the 
interests of users. 
 
4.3.2 Regulation 
This section outlines how government is developing a regulatory role in the health sector. It is not a 
comprehensive description of all government measures. 
The State Planning and Development Commission is shifting from its previous emphasis on the 
attainment of quantitative targets for buildings, equipment and personnel to a needs-based approach. It 
issued guidelines for regional health planning in 1999. A few localities have implemented these guidelines 
to rationalise the distribution of specialist services between facilities and reduce duplication of expensive 
equipment. One problem is that government has limited influence over health facilities. Hospitals finance 
their own investment and they are mostly free to make their own decisions about how to use these 
resources. Another problem is the lack of coordination between ministries involved in health. This 
highlights the need for government to define more clearly the regulatory responsibilities and powers of 
each government actor.  
A second regulatory issue concerns the need for reliable and timely information about risks to public 
health. This involves the establishment of a flow of information about outbreaks of certain communicable 
diseases from facilities through the different government levels. The SARS epidemic revealed weaknesses 
in this reporting system. 
A third issue concerns the definition of the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate 
economic behaviour. Wu (2002) refers to the strong influence of economic incentives on hospital 
behaviour, and suggests that limits to opportunistic behaviour are unclear. Bloom et al. (2001) draw similar 
conclusions about health worker livelihood strategies. They find that government has defined illegal 
behaviour, but has left a large grey area in which actors have a lot of discretion. One topic of particular 
importance is financial audit. Health facilities often keep separate sets of books for negotiating with 
government and for internal use. The lack of clear rules of financial probity and a means to enforce them 
is an important constraint to the establishment of effective health systems.  
A fourth issue concerns licensing of health workers. During the 1980s there were no clear rules about 
who was qualified to produce which services. One of the authors recalls a conversation with a County 
Health Bureau Director, who said that his health providers faced competition from veterinarians for the 
supply of drugs. It is now government policy that village doctors should pass a licensing examination to 
retain the right to practice. County health bureaux “clean the medical market” periodically to put 
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unlicensed providers out of business. It is also government policy that doctors and assistant doctors will 
eventually be licensed. This will reduce the opportunities for unskilled providers to offer services. It may 
also create problems for poor localities, which may find it difficult to retain enough licensed health 
workers. This raises questions about the phasing-in of national regulatory systems in a country with large 
inter-regional differences in level of development. 
A fifth focus is on dangerous practices. Dong et al. (1999a) describe how a series of scandals about 
counterfeit drugs led to the enactment of laws to regulate drug manufacturers during the 1980s. The 
documents to the 16th Congress call on local governments to close down illegal drug markets to further 
reduce the risk of supply of counterfeit products. On the other hand, there is little regulation of the sale of 
drugs and all products except narcotics and major tranquillisers are available everywhere. Poorly qualified 
health workers routinely prescribe steroids and sophisticated antibiotics for minor illnesses (Liu et al. 
2002).  
The experience with the regulation of health activities has similarities with that of pollution control. 
Tang (1999) argues that regulations are much more vigorously enforced when the regulator has a financial 
incentive to do so. He shows that counties ensure that food handlers have the statutory annual health 
check, because they earn money from the fees for this check. They enforce regulations concerning 
maternal and child health care less rigorously.7 This emphasises the need to pay attention to the incentives 
that regulators face.  
The experience of the pharmaceutical sector, where the government has implemented regulation of 
drug quality and licensing of drug sellers, but does not regulate the sale of drugs, illustrates another lesson 
from pollution control. The pharmaceutical sector has strong incentives to implement measures to limit 
the entrance of unregulated producers into the market. The health sector has similar incentives for 
preventing unqualified providers from selling drugs, in competition to its own health facilities. However, 
both benefit from high volumes of drug sales. This points to the need for an independent regulator.  
Public pressure has influenced the implementation of regulation. There have been periodic scandals 
concerning the quality of drugs and more recently the safety of blood products. These scandals have 
spurred efforts to establish a regulatory system. On the other hand, the greatly expanded use of 
advertisements by pharmaceutical companies has generated demand for their products. There has been 
little publicity to counter this view. 
 
                                                 
7  There is a blurring of the boundaries between incentives for necessary regulations and the imposition of 
arbitrary fees and fines. Two examples of the latter in the health sector are the imposition of a charge for ante-
natal care as part of the marriage license in a county in Yunnan Province for care at a county-level facility and 
the introduction of compulsory annual medical examinations for drivers in another province. In both cases the 
financial interests of the regulatory institutions would appear to have been more important that health-related 
objectives. 
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4.3.3 Increasing local accountability  
There are two broad areas of discussion about how users can influence service providers. One focuses on 
improving the ability of consumers to choose health services well and the other on strengthening local 
accountability.  
Some discussions focus on the need to strengthen people’s skills as consumers of health services. 
Some studies have documented the role of patients in demanding sophisticated drugs (Zhan et al. 1997). 
This has led to ideas about telling service users more about the choice of these products. For example, 
clinics and shops could be required to post guidelines for the treatment of common complaints on their 
walls. People would then know if a health worker or drug seller were offering inappropriate or 
unnecessarily expensive products. There are also discussions about the need to establish clearly 
differentiated categories of licensed practitioners to enable people to make informed choices about whom 
to consult.  
Local governments have taken some measures to make service providers more accountable to the 
population. For example, many health facilities post pictures of staff at the entrance and encourage the 
public to complain. Some medical financial assistance schemes have established telephone complaint lines. 
However, the low political priority given to health may have minimised the impact of these and other 
measures to make facilities more accountable. The most common response of people to badly performing 
health facilities is to avoid them. This may change if health is given a higher priority and local leaders take 
the performance of the health sector more seriously.  
Little is known about the operation of informal networks in the health sector or of social 
organisations of providers and users. This also applies to the factors that influence health workers 
(traditional Chinese medicine and western) at village and higher levels.  
One important element for effective regulation and democratic supervision of health services is the 
production and distribution of reliable information. There are widely acknowledged problems with the 
existing information system. One problem is the strategic use of information.8 Financial reports may not 
provide full information on sources of revenue. Reports on health outcomes may be used strategically. 
For example, some counties report different infant mortality rates in bids for funds from a donor-
supported project than in progress reports to the Ministry of Health. A second problem is that almost all 
health-related information comes from government facilities. Village health stations and private clinics 
provide very little information. A third problem concerns the flow of information. Reports are mostly 
used by higher levels of government to monitor performance. Local accountability structures and the 
general public receive little routine information on the performance of providers or the health system as a 
whole. 
 
                                                 
8  This is summed up in the expression: ‘the cadre makes the information and the information makes the cadre’. 
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5  Conclusions 
China’s recent experience demonstrates the importance of coherent institutions and shared beliefs and 
behavioural norms to health system performance. The health sector’s problems are a reflection of the 
difficulties China is experiencing in constructing institutional arrangements appropriate to a mature market 
economy. Recent government policy statements suggest that the highest political leadership is now giving 
priority to improving the performance of health and other services. In order to achieve this, it will have to 
tackle some of the most difficult issues with regard to the establishment of rules-based local administrative 
and regulatory systems and local accountability mechanisms. 
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